1995년까지만 해도 애플이 마이크로 소프트의 시가총액을 훨씬 넘어선 것을 기억하시나요?
아마도 이것을 알고 계신 분들은 이미 40대일 것이고 아닌 사람은 젊은 사람들일 것입니다. 그러나 이것은 사실입니다. 이때 애플이 플랫폼 전략을 잘 세웠더라면 우리가 요즘 모두가 사용하고 있는 윈도우 OS는 애플의 맥이 될 수도 있었던 것입니다. 그런데 왜 맥은 실패했을까요? 그 이유는 맥(Mac) OS는 플랫폼을 오픈하지 않고 자신들이 모든 것을 통제하려다 보니 플랫폼 생태계(platform ecosystem)을 만드는데 실패한 것입니다.
그렇지만 윈도우는 어플리케이션 개발에 3자가 참여하게 함으로서 훨씬 유저친화적인 운영체제를 만들 수 있었던 것이죠. 그러나 모든 것을 오픈했을까요? 절대 아닙니다. 실제 오픈이되 모든 것을 오픈한 것이 아니라 적절한 통제를 한 것이죠.
아래는 MIT 교수 쿠스마노 교수가 플랫폼의 리더쉽을 강조한 말입니다.
“It is a vision that says the whole of the ecosystem can be greater than the sum of its parts, if firms work together and follow a leader.” - Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano, Platform Leadership (HBS Press, 2002)
MIT 슬론의Cusmano 교수에 의하면 소프트웨어의 플랫폼 전략은 다음의 3가지를 고려해야 한다고 합니다. 이것은 번역없이 그대로 올립니다. 왜냐면 이것이 전달이 훨씬 더 잘 되는 것 같아서요.
• Innovation: Use R&D to solve an essential “system” problem for the industry, customers and competitors (e.g. Intel microprocessor, DOS/Windows OS, Qualcomm wireless chips, Cisco router/IOS, Google search toolbar, ARM low-power chips, Facebook Connect)
• Incentives: Facilitate external companies’ provision of complementary add-ons or services
• Open, but Not Open IP: Appear as open as possible to customers & complementors; but keep critical technology proprietary
• Network Effects: Encourage strong direct network effects such as through technical interdependencies between platform & complements – causing high multi-homing costs for users and application developers, maybe advertisers too
– But need to preserve business models & incentives of complementors, and address customer lock-in concerns
애플, 마이크로소프트 그리고 구글, 3개사의 전략에 대해서 비교을 했습니다. 세세하게 정리를 했으니 IT종사자라면 전략적 사고에 상당한 도움이 되리라 생각됩니다. 하나 하나 주의 깊에 읽어보실 것을 권해드립니다.
|
Apple |
Microsoft |
Google |
|
Closed, but not Closed |
Open, but not Open |
Free, but not Free |
|
Proprietary closed platforms, gradually open |
Proprietary but open platform |
Open & free, but…? |
|
Design elegance = whole is greater than the sum of the parts |
Price-performance |
Simple design, and hard to beat free! |
|
Ease of use |
Price-performance |
Price-performance, openness? |
|
Design from scratch but gradually iOS centric |
Windows-centric |
Search-centric? |
|
Total experience control – hardware, software, peripherals, content |
Many different companies influence the Windows experience |
In between Apple and Microsoft? |
|
Premium pricing (Mac , iPod, iPhone , iPad) |
Low pricing (Windows PCs) |
Zero pricing, or “less than free”? |
|
Marketing genius (Jobs) |
Software & platform strategy genius (Gates) |
Technology and value: Hard to beat free & the Google brand? |
|
Target early adopters, mostly consumer, but gradually more business users? |
Mainstream business & consumer users, with deep OEM relatioinships |
Consumer to business? |
|
Niche (education, desktop publishing, early adopters), moving to multiple mass markets |
Mass markets, consumer and enterprise, but most success on the PC |
Moving successfully from PC to mobile but not social media (yet)? |
|
Incredible buyer loyalty |
Buyers tolerate the product; enterprises and OEMS more loyal |
In between Apple and Microsoft? But becoming feared? |
|
Strong brand for creative users |
Strong brand for business users |
Strong brand for anything internet? |
|
Superior OS software and hardware |
OS software (& OEM hardware) trail Apple |
In between Apple and Microsoft? |
|
Relatively few but strong complements (until App Store and iTunes!!) |
Many complements (software apps); later into internet services, following Apple |
In between Apple and Microsoft? |
|
Outsource h/w manufacturing but still impacts margins |
No h/w manufacturing so higher margins, but software sales growth slow |
Free software but automated digital service = high margins, but high channel costs |
다음은 마크로소프트(MS)와 애플(Apple)의 2000년 이후 재무적인 퍼포먼스 분석입니다. 왜냐면 이들의 전략이 바뀌면서 바뀐 기업의 퍼포먼스를 비교하는데 매우 도움이 될 것이라 판단해서 입니다.
|
Microsoft |
|
Apple |
|
|
Revenues |
Operating Profits (%) |
Year-End Market Value ($m) |
|
Revenues |
Operating Profits (%) |
Year-End Market Value |
|
2010 |
$62,000* |
38.00% |
$245,000* |
|
$65,000* |
28.00% |
$312,000* |
|
2009 |
58,437 |
34.80% |
246,630 |
|
36,537 |
21.00% |
180,150 |
|
2008 |
60,420 |
37.2 |
149,769 |
|
32,479 |
19.3 |
118,441 |
|
2007 |
51,122 |
36.2 |
287,617 |
|
24,006 |
18.4 |
74,499 |
|
2006 |
44,282 |
37.2 |
251,464 |
|
19,315 |
12.7 |
45,717 |
|
2005 |
39,788 |
36.6 |
233,927 |
|
13,931 |
11.8 |
29,435 |
|
2004 |
36,835 |
24.5 |
256,094 |
|
8,279 |
3.9 |
8,336 |
|
2003 |
32,187 |
29.7 |
252,132 |
|
6,207 |
(loss) |
4,480 |
|
2002 |
28,365 |
29.2 |
215,553 |
|
5,742 |
0.3 |
4,926 |
|
2001 |
25,296 |
46.3 |
258,033 |
|
5,363 |
(loss) |
7,924 |
|
2000 |
22,956 |
47.9 |
302,326 |
|
7,983 |
6.5 |
5,384 |
마지막으로 Cusmano 교수님의 결론입니다.
• Mobile industry an illustration of tension between innovation & commoditization, and rising importance of platforms and services over standalone products
– the product (e.g. the handset & OS) may be subsidized heavily or even free, but users will pay for the services that make the boxes valuable
• Apple a temporary exception with expensive “hit” products (Macbooks, iPod, iPhone, iPad). But prices will decline over time, and complementary service platforms – iTunes, App Store, iBooks, iAdds – needed to add value and generate $$ and powerful cross-platform network effects
– Apple took a page from Microsoft and decided to create both primary and a complementary platforms
• Great “product strategy” & design capabilities not enough to win in a platform market
– Platform markets need a platform strategy (relatively open access + innovative complements ecosystem) to succeed
– Variations: Open, but not Open; Closed, but not Closed; Free, but not Free
– Which is better and when?
• Apple learned from the Macintosh vs. Windows debacle
– Less closed, cross-platform strategy for iPod, iTunes, iPhone, and iPad
– Concept of “platform envelopment” useful here
• But not all platform markets are WTA like Windows!
– Mobile value chain a complex “multi-sided” market, with a half-dozen leverage points, regional preferences & politics, and different devices that are substitutes (including feature phones for smart-phones and tables for PCs). Much more difficult for 1 firm to dominate.
– Major geographic variations (US, Europe, Japan, India, China, etc.)
스티브잡스와 빌게이츠에 대해서 알고 싶다면 아래 링크를 참조하시면 도움이 될 것입니다. 하나 하나가 너무 재미있습니다. 그냥 추억으로 남겨두긴 아까운 비디오 클립들입니다.
비디오 클립
1. Windows 95 and Apple Mac Origins (1995, from Bob Cringely, “Triumph of the Nerds,” 9 minutes)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KhjVidOFqBo&feature=related
2. Macintosh Launch Video with Steve Jobs (1984, 5 minutes)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2B-XwPjn9YY
3. Young Bill Gates Applauding the Macintosh (1984, 20 seconds)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNiPHrMhmBE
4. Steve Ballmer Selling Windows 1.0 for $99 (1 minute)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGvHNNOLnCk&feature=related
5. Steve Jobs on “Microsoft Has No Taste” (from 1995 documentary, and later clips, 3 minutes)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBISzVRmYIM&feature=related
6. Steve Jobs and Bill Gates at WSJ “All Things Digital” Interview (2007, highlights, 8 minutes)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3tUkyCRp0A&feature=related
관련기사
4. The Rise of Apps, iPad and Android
5. Apple to Tighten Control on Content
더 괜찮은 것들이 있다면 추천바랍니다. 추가하겠습니다.
그리고 여기 있는 자료들은 절대 펌금지입니다.
